The interiorization of Brazilian violence, policing, and economic growth  by Steeves, Geoffrey M. et al.
Av
t
e
T
a
t
r
©
r
J
K
R
d
h
á
m
u
p
e
a
©
r
P
h
1Available  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
HOSTED BY
EconomiA 16 (2015) 359–375
The interiorization of Brazilian violence, policing, and economic
growth,
Geoffrey M. Steeves, Francis Carlo Petterini ∗, Guilherme V. Moura
Department of Economics, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil
Received 25 February 2015; received in revised form 3 September 2015; accepted 13 September 2015
Available online 9 November 2015
bstract
Brazilian homicide rates are among the highest in the world, inclusive of actual war zones. However, the character of Brazil’s
iolence is changing. Recent analyses highlight a trend of dispersion of violence such that homicide rates in urban areas, traditionally
he most violent places, have stagnated and declined while smaller cities and rural areas experienced a marked increase. An incipient
xplanation is that this trend is related to greater economic dynamism in the smaller cities, unaccompanied by increased policing.
his article’s empirical analysis uses locational Hoover indexes to express the dispersions of violence and economic activity, and
lso generates a proxy to measure the geographic concentration of police forces. Using panel data across all 26 states from 1995
o 2011, we find evidence of a correlation between dispersion of violence and GDP to less urban areas, and ambiguous results
egarding police concentration.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: K42; R58
eywords: Homicides; Violence dissemination; Hoover index
esumo
As taxas de homicídio do Brasil estão entre as mais altas do mundo, inclusive das atuais zonas de guerra. No entanto, o caráter
essa violência está mudando. Análises recentes destacam uma tendência de dispersão de violência, de forma que as taxas de
omicídio em áreas urbanas, tradicionalmente os lugares mais violentos, estagnaram e declinaram, enquanto cidades menores e
reas rurais experimentaram um aumento acentuado. Uma explicac¸ão incipiente é que esta tendência está relacionada com um
aior dinamismo econômico nas cidades menores, sem haver um aumento do efetivo policial. A análise empírica deste artigo
tiliza índices locacionais de Hoover para expressar as dispersões da violência e da atividade econômica, e também um indicador
ara medir a concentrac¸ão geográfica das forc¸as policiais. Usando dados de um painel dos 26 estados brasileiros entre 1995-2011,
ncontram-se evidências de uma correlac¸ão entre a dispersão da violência e do PIB para as áreas menos urbanas, e alguns resultados
mbíguos em relac¸ão à concentrac¸ão da polícia
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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1.  Introduction
Brazil is a violent place. In fact, the country ranks among the most violent nations in the world, with an intentional
homicide annual rate ranging around 27 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants. This rate is roughly two to three times
that of the United States and upwards of 40 times that of Japan. To put Brazilian violence in perspective, consider some
of these staggering facts1:
• Between 1980 and 2010 more people died in Brazilian homicides caused by fire arms than the combined total of
the 12 bloodiest armed conflicts in the world during the same period.
• Brazil is one of the few countries in the world where homicide rates surpass traffic accident mortality rates.
• Nearly two in five of all registered deaths for men aged 15–24 are the result of homicides.
These levels of violence exist and persevere despite Brazil being a nation without territorial disputes, civil war, or
pronounced racial or ethnic tensions. It is clear that this violence costs Brazilian society dearly and is therefore among
the nation’s top challenges.
However, the nature of this violence is changing. Waiselfisz (2011), in his annual editions of Mapa  da  Violência2
(Map of Violence), noted that in recent years big cities experienced declining rates of violence while the previously
tranquil countryside saw dramatic increases. He termed this shift the interiorization  of violence. Andrade and Diniz
(2013) analyzed Waiselfisz’s data and found indications that the areas that experienced the greatest uptick in violence
also had the greatest economic growth.
The standard analysis of the economics of crime is based on Becker (1968), and assumes criminals act rationally
considering not only the benefits, but also the costs of their actions. If the probability of being caught is low, then the
expected benefits of committing a crime may outweigh the costs. In this light, criminal activity, and therefore violence,
should increase in lockstep with economic growth (increased benefits) and a lacking police presence (reduced costs).
Following the rationale of Becker, the conclusions of Andrade and Diniz (2013) appear to explain only part of
the interiorization of violence – that violent criminals are drawn to the benefits associated with economic dynamism.
However, the migration of violence to the countryside could also be framed in terms of costs. Specifically, criminals are
likely incentivized to migrate to the countryside to take advantage of the reduced costs associated with a lacking police
presence. For example, Di Tella et al. (2004), Evans and Owens (2007) and Draca et al. (2011) already documented
causal relationships between greater policing and less crime.
In fact, the press has also taken notice of criminals targeting less well-policed areas. News stories abound, high-
lighting trends of crime, and especially violent crime, migrating from big cities to rural areas. The media reports these
stories on a frequent basis and emphasize the lacking police presence in the countryside vis-a-vis urban centers as
causal to the migration.3
Brazil attempted to combat its violence epidemic by raising the costs violent criminals faced by increasing spending
on public security. According to the Anuário Brasileiro de Seguranc¸a Pública (ABSP, Annual Yearbook of Public
Safety)4 and the Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN, Secretary of the Treasury)5 the total expenditures in public
security among states more than doubled from 1995 to 2011 from R$ 109 to R$ 252 per person. Additionally, the
policed force nearly doubled from roughly 306 thousand state police in 2004 (the first year of ABSP) to 527 thousand
by 2011. In relative terms, this was a rate increase of 171 police per 100 thousand inhabitants to 290.If these expenditures were more heavily concentrated in urban areas, which would leave the countryside relatively
less secure, it may explain the spread of violence to these less populated areas. It is this possibility, which suggests that
violent criminals are fleeing the more heavily-policed urban areas for less well-protected targets in the countryside, that
1 Details in UNODC (2011).
2 See mapadaviolencia.org.br.
3 One compelling anecdote suggesting the interiorization of violence highlights a criminal gang in Goiás that specializes in armed robbery
of ATM cash machines. In a taped conversation, gang leaders consider potential targets based on their relative lack of security resources.
In this example, the gang preferred to rob ATMs in a smaller city with “only two police officers and one patrol car.” See 1:05 the video:
g1.globo.com/bom-dia-brasil/videos/t/edicoes/v/presa-quadrilha-que-explodia-caixas-eletronicos-em-goias/2934315
4 See forumseguranca.org.br/produtos/anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica.
5 See: tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/estados municipios.
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s often presented in the media. However, to explore the viability of this assertion requires knowledge of the distribution
f the police force within states.
Unfortunately, data on the geographical distribution of the police force is not readily available. ABSP, which
athers aggregate data from the Labor Ministry’s (Ministério do Trabalho) Relac¸ão Anual de Informac¸ões Sociais
RAIS, Annual Report on Social Information),6 only calculates the total number of police in the state. It is not able
o break out the distribution of the police force by municipality because the civil and military police forces, as state
ntities, registers its officers in the state capital rather than the cities in which they actually work. Therefore, little can
e said on how the police force is distributed within a state.7
To address this limitation, we develop a proxy capable of capturing the geographical distribution of the police
orce. This proxy is developed by obtaining household and census data from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
statistica (IBGE) and then comparing it to respondents that identify as military police from the Classification of
razilian Occupations (CBO).8
Armed with a method to determine the geographical distribution of the police force within a state the article takes
im at analyzing the trend of interiorization of violence. First, we propose a measure to capture the trend of violence
ispersing from population centers to the countryside, known as the locational Hoover index. As will be seen, this
etric, which is flexible to each location or municipality considered, is more capable in measuring interiorization
hen compared to the simple binary approach of categorizing municipalities into two categories – either countryside
r urban. Additionally, the index has straight-forward interpretation as is interpreted as the percent of homicides that
ould need to be redistributed across all municipalities for a state to achieve an equal homicide distribution.
Having a way to more adequately measure the dispersion of violence, this research evaluates how key variables are
elated to the trend of interiorization. First, as in Andrade and Diniz (2013), our model focuses on the incentives or
enefits violent criminals may have to migrate to more rural locations by considering each state’s relative concentration
f GDP. States that have increased economic activity in the countryside may attract crime to these areas of new-found
rosperity. Secondly, as evidenced in the media, our model includes the geographical concentration of the police force
o determine the extent to which an increased police presence in urban areas is related to the dispersion of violence.
ltimately, we find evidence of a correlation between dispersion of violence and increased economic dynamism in
ess urban areas, but ambiguous results regarding the relationship between interiorization and the concentration of the
olice force in urban areas.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section two explains the motivation and context that underpin
his research. Section three explains the methodology and data by focusing on the development of the locational
oover index, our proxy for police force concentration, and the empirical model. Section four discusses key results.
onclusions are offered in the final section.
.  Motivation  and  context
While considering the background and motivation for studying patterns of violence in Brazil, it is necessary to
ustify our choice to use the homicide rate as the best overall indicator of violence. Although violence manifests itself
n various forms ranging from intimidation to robbery to murder, this study follows Waiselfisz (2011) in considering
omicidal violence as the best measure of violence. The first reason that the homicide rate is the most adequate measure
f violence is that murder reveals violence in its most severe form. In this sense, relating violence to homicides is akin
o public health studies that measure the effect of an endemic by its death toll. The second reason homicides are the
est measure of violence is one of practicality – there are simply few alternatives. Trustworthy and comprehensive
ata on lesser forms of violence, such as armed robbery, are serially under-reported, misreported, miscategorized, and
rone to heterogeneity across micro-regions. Police precincts lack uniformity in defining and categorizing violent acts,
nd may feel pressure to underreport crime and violence statistics. An advantage to using homicides is that they less
6 See: mte.gov.br/rais.
7 As highlighted in the survey of Santos and Kassouf (2008) about criminal studies in Brazil, the national data bases are extremely limited.
8 See: mtecbo.gov.br. IBGE, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. CBO, Classificac¸ão Brasileira de Ocupac¸ões. Data on households
re determined from PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilio) the National Research of Household Samples.
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Table 1
Homicide rate rankings for Brazilian States, 2000 and 2010.
2000 2010
State Rate Position Rate Position
Alagoas 25.6 11th 66.8 1th
Espírito Santo 46.8 3th 50.1 2th
Pará 13.0 21th 45.9 3th
Pernambuco 54.0 1th 38.8 4th
Amapá 32.5 9th 38.7 5th
Paraíba 15.1 20th 38.6 6th
Bahia 9.4 23th 37.7 7th
Rondônia 33.8 8th 34.6 8th
Paraná 18.5 16th 34.4 9th
Distrito Federal 37.5 7th 34.2 10th
Sergipe 23.3 12th 33.3 11th
Mato Grosso 39.8 5th 31.7 12th
Amazonas 19.8 14th 30.6 13th
Ceará 16.5 17th 29.7 14th
Goiás 20.2 13th 29.4 15th
Roraima 39.5 6th 27.3 16th
Rio de Janeiro 51.0 2th 26.2 17th
Mato Grosso do Sul 31.0 10th 25.8 18th
Rio Grande do Norte 9.0 24th 22.9 19th
Tocantins 15.5 19th 22.5 20th
Maranhão 6.1 27th 22.5 21th
Acre 19.4 15th 19.6 22th
Rio Grande do Sul 16.3 18th 19.3 23th
Minas Gerais 11.5 22th 18.1 24th
São Paulo 42.2 4th 13.9 25th
Piauí 8.2 25th 13.7 26th
Santa Catarina 7.9 26th 12.9 27thData Source: Mapa da Violência. Table generated by authors.
prone to interpretation and manipulation. Homicides must be officially registered on death certificates, typically by
trained medical professionals, and are therefore more likely to be credibly and consistently reported.
Beyond acknowledging Brazil’s severe violence epidemic, it is also critical to recognize that the character of violence
is changing. Places such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo – once undisputed leaders in the Brazilian violence panorama –
realized a dramatic reduction in their homicide rates. During the same time period less populated and previously peaceful
regions experienced increased levels of violence. Waiselfisz (2011) separates these dynamics of violence dispersion
from populated to rural areas into two components: dissemination  and interiorization. Dissemination accounts for the
part of the migration that occurs when violent crime leaves one state for another. This phenomenon can be thought of
as migration between  states. Table 1 highlights how the seven most violent states in 2000 became much less  violent by
2010. During the same period however, the 17 least violent states in 2000 became much more  so. The outcomes are
striking.
During this 10-year span, the most violent states, with the exception of Espirito Santo, became much less  so. In
fact, in the seven most-violent Brazilian states, homicide rates fell from 47.1 to 22.6. The most dramatic changes
occurred in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro whose rankings moved from 4th to 25th and 2nd to 17th place, respectively.
The counter examples showing relatively peaceful states turn to violence are equally striking. The 17 safest states saw
homicide rates more than double from 11.7 to 28.4. Previously safe states, such as Alagoas and Pará, changed the most
dramatically. Pará moved from 21st to fourth place and Alagoas moved from 11th place to become the most violent
state in Brazil.This research focuses on the second component of the violence dispersion referred to as interiorization. This
phenomenon is characterized as intra-state redistribution and is typically explained by violence leaving capital cities
and larger metropolitan areas for the countryside.
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Fig. 1 shows the evolution of homicide rates from 1995 to 2011 in the capital/metropolitan regions, at the national
evel, and the countryside using data from the Brazilian Health Ministry’s information department, Sistema  de
nformac¸ões sobre  Mortalidade  and Secretaria  de  Vigilância  em  Saúde  (SIM/SVS/MS).9
Of note is the declining trend in the homicide rate in capital cities and larger metropolises after 2004. This declining
endency could be attributed to the Estatuto do Desarmamento (Disarmament Statute) which came into effect in the
ame year and greatly restricted the civilian population’s access to weapons. The effects of Estatuto do Desarmamento
n violence are covered more extensively by Dreyfus and Nascimento (2005), Soares and Scorzafave (2008) and
erqueira and Mello (2012), and, we do not elaborate on the specifics in this article. However, Fig. 1 also shows an
ncreasing trend of violence in the countryside throughout the period that is consistent with Waiselfisz’s pattern of
nteriorization.
Following Becker (1968), one possible explanation for the rise of homicides in the countryside, is that a criminal’s
ncentives, or expected benefits, to conduct violent behavior may have changed relative to urban areas. Andrade and
iniz (2013) argue that this violence increase is related to the higher expected benefits associated with greater economic
rowth in the smaller cities and towns. Their spatial analysis, which is more sophisticated than Waiselfisz’s simple break
ut of urban and rural areas, suggests that interiorization did not happen evenly across all municipalities. Specifically,
hey find that violence tended to cluster around areas with increased economic dynamism where land use was recently
eorganized, suggesting that violence may be following  the  money  to rural areas with new found wealth. Andrade and
iniz (2013), however, did not conduct a formal statistical analysis to confirm their hypothesis. This research fills this
oid by empirically modeling the relationship between the dispersion of violence and relative changes of economic
rosperity within states.
We also consider the expected costs associated with conducting violence. News stories abound suggesting that
iolent crime migrated from urban to rural areas due to the precarious police presence found in the countryside.
ewspapers and social media are replete with examples that suggest these violent crimes occurred, at least in part,
ue to inadequate policing. The low probability of being apprehended or injured while perpetrating these crimes likely
owers a criminal’s perceived costs. Stories and reports that highlight the difficulties encountered by the police in small
own Brazil vary in scope. Some anecdotes tell the story of policemen, critically short on backup support, that are
10nwilling to confront heavily armed bandits to stop a crime. Other reports highlight the difficulty of keeping the
eace in communities that have only one police officer.11 Others assert that bandits are taking to the highways to prey
n smaller, less protected areas, outside of the urban core.12 These examples suggest that inadequate police forces
9 See Santos and Kassouf (2008) for details about SIM/SVS/MS databases.
10 https://youtube/5BCxqhRGvoE.
11 http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticias/noticia/2015/05/cidades-do-interior-tem-apenas%-um-policial-militar-4762170.html.
12 http://diariodonordeste.verdesmares.com.br/cadernos/policia/crime-migra-para-o-interior-1.659806.
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fail to prevent crime from happening. Yet another downside of inadequately manned precincts is that they don’t have
sufficient resources to investigate, prosecute, or punish criminals known to have perpetrated heinous acts.13
The hypothesis of greater economic dynamism in the smaller cities introduced by Andrade and Diniz (2013),
together with news stories and anecdotes presented in the Brazilian media, are consistent with Becker (1968) in that
criminals are motivated by profit and will seek to minimize their costs and maximize their rewards. This argument
is also consistent with Di Tella et al. (2004) that found a large deterrent effect of observable police on crime. In this
sense, a logical outcome of increased public expenditures on law enforcement in cities may be to push criminals toward
less-policed areas, since it raises their costs. Likewise, violence moving to areas of recent economic development is
also consistent with Becker’s theory of profit maximizing criminals.
But deterring crime by raising criminal’s expected costs is almost certainly an incomplete analysis. The traditional
public security model, which focuses on controlling criminal behavior through policies that focus on the consequences
of being caught committing a crime, fails to consider the underlying root causes of violence. While raising the costs
of committing crime may deter crime up to a point, to truly diminish violence, rather than merely shift its location, a
comprehensive approach is required.14
Similarly, it is prudent to consider other social indicators that influence violence. One of the most common topics
in the general literature of violence explores the relationship between income inequality and violence. The works of
Marmot et al. (1987) and Towsend and Davidson (1990) generally show that unequal income distributions are related
with higher homicide rates. These relationships also hold for Brazil. As demonstrated by Szwarcwald et al. (1999),
homicide rates, as well as several indicators of health, are highly correlated with income inequality within the state of Rio
de Janeiro. In Brazil a robust literature, that includes a survey of Santos and Kassouf (2008), aims to explore the diverse
causes that generate violence within its borders. Lima et al. (2005), discusses several of the socioeconomic determinants
that contribute to the high rates of homicides in the state of Pernambuco. This research creates a spatial analysis using
a host of factors such as precarious living situations, exposure to crime and drug trafficking, unemployment, illiteracy,
income, and a lack of upward mobility. Income inequality is viewed as a particularly important factor that fuels an
individual’s frustration and prevents them from achieving “socially legitimate goals”. Violence is also shown to affect
the population in unequal ways and is skewed toward certain demographics – particularly young, male, black individuals
that reside in certain geographic areas. Urbanization is also associated with heightened levels of violence.
The complex nature of violence demands that to explain the dispersion of violence, one must consider more possible
factors beyond than the economic approach espoused by Becker (1968). Researchers are compelled to analyze the roots
and causes of violence through alternative lenses of public health, psychology, biology, and political science, and eco-
nomics. This multidisciplinary approach allows for an analysis from varied angles and results are often complementary
with economics-based studies. When considering Brazil’s violence panorama, one must remember the myriad factors
that shape violent outcomes, in addition to economic growth and the distribution of security forces.
3.  Methodology  and  data
This section is divided in five parts. The first argues that the dichotomy of interior/capital presented in Waiselfisz
(2011) may not be adequate to measure “interiorization”, and presents the locational  Hoover  as a superior metric. The
second section highlights that Hoover statistics calculated for homicides (homicide Hoovers) are correlated with Hoover
statistics calculated on GDP (GDP Hoovers). This correlation supports Andrade and Diniz (2013) by showing that
violence spreads to the countryside along side economic prosperity. The third section presents the relationship between
homicide Hoovers and expenditures on security and suggest that, in line with the media’s assertion, violence may be
attracted to areas with less security. The fourth section proposes a proxy to measure the geographical concentration of
the police force. The fifth section discusses the econometric model.
13 http://mais.uol.com.br/view/8bak1uywu0n2/crimes-ficam-impunes-por-falta-de-estrutura-da%%-policia-civil-em-caruaru-04028C1B3364D09-
95326?types=A.
14 See, for example, Assis (1999) or Cruz Neto and Moreira (1999).
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Table 2
Numerical example.
Order 1 Order 2
i pi hi vi pi hi vi
1 .4 .7 −.3 .4 .7 −.3
2 .3 .1 .2 .1 .1 0
3 .2 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1
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.1.  Locational  Hoover  overview
The analyses of Waiselfisz (2011) and Andrade and Diniz (2013) aimed to highlight the contrast between the
haracter of violence found in urban and rural areas, in order to quantify its dispersion. Their analyses have the
dvantages of being intuitive and relatively easy to construct, but they are unable to consider economically thriving
maller cities to where violence can also spread. In order to better quantify this dispersion, we propose the locational
oover index.
The locational  Hoover  index is a measure typically employed by geographers, as noted in Hoover (1941) and
ogerson and Plane (2013), used to analyze population concentrations relative to land areas. In Zhao et al. (2003)
oover is also called a Spatial  Imbalance  Index. While the Hoover index could be applied to measure inequality,
uch as income inequality, we specify a locational Hoover to underscore its application in measuring spatial imbalance.
his locational Hoover index’s construction allows it to measure the relative concentration or imbalance between any
wo entities and is specified:
Hoovert = 12
∑
i
∣∣∣∣
Pit∑
iPit
− Hit∑
iHit
∣∣∣∣
here Hoovert is the statistic in year t, and Pit and Hit are population and number of homicides of the given municipality
 at year t, respectively.
Thus, the Hoover index relates any given municipality’s proportion of the overall population to its relative proportion
f homicides. The statistic is bounded between 0 and 1, such that lower values indicate more balanced distributions
hile values approaching unity are more imbalanced.
One of the homicide Hoover’s advantages is its straightforward numerical interpretation. The statistic itself is
nterpreted as the percentage of the total homicides that would need to be redistributed across all municipalities for a
tate to achieve an equal homicide distribution.
Table 2 offers a example that outlines the usefulness of Hoover in measuring the distribution of violence. First,
onsider a space containing i  = 1, . . ., n units of observation and a measure of relative violence, vi, where vi =  pi −  hi,
i = (iPi)−1Pi and hi = (iHi)−1Hi. vi represents the relative imbalance of violence of unit i  with respect to all units
f observation.
In Order  1  the most violent region in the set is i = 1 which possesses 70% of the total homicides and has 40% of
he total population. Its vi =  −.3, is the largest in magnitude in the sample and the fact that its value is less than zero
mplies that region i = 1 is more violent relative to the average. Correspondingly, observations with vi >  0, such as
 = 2, 3 show regions relatively less violent in comparison to the set as a whole. The final observation, i = 4, with a
i =  0 is an example of a region where levels of violence are exactly proportional to its population.
These proportional differences of homicides relative to population, vi, are in turn used to construct the Hoover
ndex, .5i|vi|, for the entire set of observations. The Hoover statistic in this example is.3, which has the interpretation
hat 30% of the homicides must be spatially reallocated to ensure a balanced distribution of violence.
To highlight Hoover’s suitability when compared to other measures consider the following. In cases where there
xists only one possible ordering of the variable of interest, the ordering is considered single dimension. This is the case,
or example, when measuring income inequality. However, in cases where there exist multiple variables of interest,
r multidimensional, the order matters. In the multidimensional case it is necessary to specify locational  to make the
istinction.
366 G.M. Steeves et al. / EconomiA 16 (2015) 359–375Fig. 2. Locational Lorenz curve: graphical analysis by order.
To see why order matters, consider Order  1  from Table 2. In Order 1, the regions are ranked, from highest to lowest,
in terms of homicides. In Order 2 they are ranked according to population. Although the two regions considered are
identical, the dimension by which they are ordered, can lead to inconsistent outcomes when calculating a Gini Index.
To demonstrate this contradiction consider the Lorenz curve in Fig. 2a. The Gini coefficient is represented by the
area between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve divided by.5, and is calculated by summing the area of 4 trapezoids
and subtracting the triangle. In this case the Gini statistic is calculated as:
Gini  =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(.7 +  0) (.4 −  0) +
(.8 +  .7) (.7 −  .4) +
(.9 +  .8) (.8 −  .7) +
(1 +  .9) (1 −  .8)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−  1 =  .28
When ranked by population, as in Order 1, it is calculated as.28.
Now consider Order  2  from Table 2, where regions are ranked according to homicides. In this case the Gini statistic
is calculated as:
Gini  =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(.7 +  0) (.4 −  0) +
(.8 +  .7) (.5 −  .4) +
(.9 +  .8) (.7 −  .5) +
(1 +  .9) (1 −  .7)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−  1 =  .34
Despite being identical samples, the dimension by which they are ranked, can lead to different Gini statistics.
Additionally, there are two other orderings possible: ranking homicides smallest to largest with population smallest
to largest as well as homicides smallest to largest with population largest to smallest. This would move the position of
the curve either above or below the 45 degree line.
However, unlike the Gini, the Hoover index is invariant to the dimension by which the data set is ordered. As demon-
strated by Alonso-Villar (2011), the Hoover index is always the greatest distance between the line of equality/equal
distribution and the Lorenz curve. As seen in Fig. 2, the Hoover does not change if the Lorenz curve is above or below
the 45 degree line.
The Hoover index is particularly apt to analyze patterns across time to identify trends in dispersion or concentration.
If, for example, Hoover  < 0, between two consecutive periods, violence is spreading more equally across the regions.
Likewise a Hoover  > 0 between periods indicates that violence has become more concentrated.
Armed with information on homicides and populations, the Hoover index can be applied to measure and detect shifts
in the distribution of violence. The homicide rate, expressed as the number of homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants,
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s an effective way to measure the relative level of violence within a specific observation such as a municipality. The
omicide Hoover index, however, allows for interpretation beyond a single observation/location to characterize the
elative distribution of violence across numerous observations within a data set.
Fig. 3 uses data on homicides to show how the Hoover homicide index characterizes the interiorization of violence
aised by Waiselfisz (2011). The scatter between homicide Hoover in the countryside and the national homicide
oover, which considers all Brazilian municipalities, emphasizes how Hoover is able to illustrate the phenomenon of
nteriorization. For example, the 1990s are marked by relatively high national Hoovers and relatively low countryside
oovers suggesting that the distribution of homicides was less equally distributed at the national level when compared
o rural areas. The trend toward interiorization is evident throughout the 2000s which showed a more equal national
istribution of homicides and a less evenly distributed homicides in rural areas. These patterns suggest that while the
ational distribution of homicides became more equal across time, certain unfortunate rural municipalities bore the
runt of increases in violence.
Overall, there are numerous advantages in using the Hoover to index to analyze distributions. The locational Hoover
ndex:
. is a more comprehensive measure when compared to the dichotomy of urban/rural, and thus represents an improve-
ment over the measures used in Waiselfisz (2011) and Andrade and Diniz (2013);
. captures the interiorization phenomenon in a single variable, obviating the need to make side-by-side comparisons
between two variables, and facilitating regression analysis;
. is easy to calculate allowing it to be applied to similar studies;
. has a straightforward interpretation that measures the imbalance  of a dataset;
. is invariant to the ordering of multivariable data sets, which is different than the locational Gini; and,
. does not require the calculation of a log, as with the Theil index. This advantage is particularly relevant in data sets
that include many zeros, as is the case when a large number of municipalities register zero homicides.
.2.  Interiorization  of  violence  and  economy
Central to our analysis is determining the degree to which violence is related to economic dynamism as presented
patially in Andrade and Diniz (2013). Given that we’ve demonstrated the interiorization of violence, we must also
ssess whether economic prosperity has also spread to the Brazilian interior. To this end, this section calculates a GDP
oover to measure the interiorization of economic growth in Brazil across the same time period.
Fig. 4a and b shows a clear relationship between the distribution of homicides and the distribution of GDP, when
onsidering municipalities in all the 26 Brazilian states. Fig. 4a captures the evolution of these distributions over time.
t the beginning of the sample, in the 1990s, both homicides and GDP were unequally distributed and concentrated
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in urban areas. However, over time, both homicides and GDP became much more evenly distributed by 2011. Fig. 4b,
highlights the overall relationship between violence and economic dynamism. The strong positive relationship between
these two variables, suggests that during the same time period that homicides become more evenly distributed, GDP
also became more evenly distributed. These figures corroborate the thesis of Andrade and Diniz (2013) that suggests
violence tends to migrate toward areas of increased wealth.
3.3.  Interiorization  of  violence  and  public  safety
As previously addressed, the Brazilian media has taken note of the relationship between an insufficient police
presence and rising levels of crime and violence. One hypothesis to explain this trend is that increased expenditures
on public security in urban areas are causing violence to diffuse to the countryside. In other words, an increased police
presence in big cities could be incentivizing criminals to target the relatively less protected countryside.
In order to test this hypothesis it is necessary to understand how state governments allocate their public security
expenditures. Fig. 5 explains the relationship between per capita public security expenditures (constant values 2011),
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Fig. 5. Scatter between Public Security Expenditures, per capita, constant values 2011, and Hoover. Source of data: SIM/SVS/MS, STN and IBGE.
Figure generated by authors.
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lnd the homicide Hoover Index.15 Fig. 5 shows that in the 1990s, when per capita spending was fairly low, Hoover
alues were relatively high, suggesting that homicidal violence was skewed toward more urban areas. Over time the
rend shows that as state governments increased expenditures, levels of violence became more evenly distributed across
tates, raising the possibility that violence “leaked” from the cities to the countryside.
Closer analysis reveals that the government responded to alarmingly high levels of violence by increasing expend-
tures on law enforcement and public security. As observed in Fig. 5, real per capita expenditures for Brazil more than
oubled from 1995 to 2011 from 109 to 252 reals per person. Adjusted for inflation, all states increased their public
ecurity budgets, some drastically so. Of note is the major increase in per capita expenditures between 2000 and 2001,
hich is visually represented by significant gap between these two years in Fig. 5. This marked increase in expenditures
s attributed to the passage of the Fundo  Nacional  de  Seguranc¸a  Pública  (FNSP, National Public Security Plan) that
ncreased security expenditures in Brazil’s most violent places.
These dramatic increases in security spending beg the following question: to what extent did these expenditures
eshape the landscape of Brazilian violence? At first glance the relationship presented in Fig. 5, especially when
oupled with daily news reports of increased countryside violence, seems to suggest that increases in public security
xpenditures, are causing  this interiorization of violence.
However, if this graphic were constructed alongside other types of expenditures, such as education or health, a
imilar pattern of correlation would be found. This suggests that the correlation presented in Fig. 5, and propagated by
he media, could be spurious. To illustrate this point, the same process was repeated with expenditures in education and
ealth. As seen in Fig. 6 a similar correlation is found between these other types of government expenditures during
he same period.
Analysis is hindered by the inability to break out the expenditures presented in Fig. 6 into urban and rural components.
atabases are limited by the fact that states do not compile regionalized expenditure data. The inability to break out intra
tate expenditures makes it difficult to determine the relationship between the concentration of security expenditures
n urban areas and the spread of violence. This limitation forces us to consider alternative ways to measure police force
oncentration. The proxy we develop to overcome this obstacle is discussed in the following section.15 To calculate public security expenditures, state expenditures in “public security” were collected from the national treasury:
esouro.fazenda.gov.br/estados municipios. These values were adjusted to 2011 prices via the IPCA price index. Finally, these constant price
evel expenditures were divided by IBGE’s population figures to arrive at per capita expenditures.
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3.4.  Proxy:  the  concentration  of  the  police  force  in  capital/metropolitan  cities
Given the difficulties regarding data availability discussed in the previous section, we propose a proxy capable of
measuring the concentration of a state’s police force in its capital and metropolitan cities. The process to construct this
proxy is explained in the following steps16:
• Compile census questionnaires from 2000 to 2010, as well as the PNAD household data from IBGE during the
period 1995–2011.
• Of the people coded as “employed,” we capture those coded with the occupation of CBO, throwing out missing
observations.
• Select only the observations codes by the CBO as soldiers, military police, inspectors, detectives, and administrative
clerks of the civil police.
• Among those selected, we apply the weight of each observation computed by IBGE according to their sampling
scheme, and separate them into capital/metropolitan city or not.
First, to test the quality of the procedure, we aggregate our proxy summing up the weights of all the observations of
municipalities of a given state and year, and then comparing it with the state-level data from ABSP (Annual Yearbook
of Public Safety). Table 3 compares the total number of police in the state calculated by ABSP with our proxy for the
percent of the police force living in the capitals or metropolitan areas in the years available in the directory. The high
correlation between ABSP and the proxy suggests that the procedure is sound.
Next, we use this proxy to graphically compare the geographical distribution of the police force with the interi-
orization of violence. Below Fig. 7a shows a scatter plot between the the proxy for the percentage of policemen in
capital/metropolitan cities at a national level alongside the homicide Hoover. In the national context, where 50–60
percent of the police force are resident in these urban areas, we note little evidence of correlation.
However, when broken out at the state level, as shown in Fig. 7b, a much stronger correlation is shown. This
correlation suggests that in states where the police force is more heavily concentrated in urban areas, violence is also
distributed more equally. This graphic seems to consistent with the vision espoused by the media, that higher expendi-
tures in urban areas are correlated with lower Hoover values and an interiorization of violence. These correlations are
analyzed more closely in the following sections.
16 A similar procedure was adopted by Fajnzylber and Araujo Junior (2001).
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Table 3
Estimates of the number of state police according to ABSP and the proposed proxy – in thousands.
State 2004 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011
ABSP Proxy ABSP Proxy ABSP Proxy ABSP Proxy ABSP Proxy ABSP Proxy
Acre 3.6 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.8 2.0 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.9 2.6
Alagoas 9.7 4.5 9.4 8.7 10.2 12.1 8.5 8.1 9.5 8.3
Amapá 1.5 3.5 3.9 5.1 3.7 3.7 2.3 3.6 1.3 3.3 4.8 3.4
Amazonas 3.0 8.6 1.5 5.2 8.5 8.5 8.6 6.5 9.8 5.4 10.3 6.0
Bahia 28.1 26.8 33.7 26.9 32.8 27.0 43.6 23.4 33.8 23.9 37.6 23.7
Ceará 14.1 11.6 14.3 15.2 14.8 11.4 12.5 13.0 17.1 12.7
Espírito Santo 1.7 8.0 8.6 8.1 8.5 6.2 9.5 6.1 9.7 6.0 10.0 6.1
Goiás 15.2 17.2 16.0 12.4 16.1 14.6 17.3 12.2 14.4 10.8 15.9 11.4
Maranhão 7.9 8.8 8.0 3.3 9.2 7.9 7.2 8.7 7.6 7.1 9.8 7.9
Mato Grosso 8.4 9.6 8.5 7.8 9.9 5.5 6.0 5.4 9.6 5.7
Mato Grosso do Sul 6.1 6.2 6.9 4.9 6.6 3.2 3.4 4.7 3.0 5.1 7.6 4.9
Minas Gerais 46.1 47.8 49.6 43.1 58.0 42.4 55.8 45.8 55.4 39.5 55.6 42.8
Pará 2.5 15.2 2.6 19.0 15.8 13.6 17.8 15.4 21.3 13.9 2.9 14.7
Paraíba 7.2 10.6 8.5 11.3 3.8 6.8 7.4 9.4 7.4 11.1 7.4
Paraná 20.2 21.7 20.9 17.0 15.8 12.9 22.5 16.8 21.7 13.1 21.3 15.2
Pernambuco 21.8 16.3 21.4 20.7 24.1 18.1 20.2 18.1 19.1 18.9 25.6 18.5
Piauí 4.7 7.3 6.8 5.6 3.7 3.0 5.5 4.7 5.1 7.3 5.3
Rio de Janeiro 46.4 47.8 40.2 47.7 43.2 38.7 37.7 53.1 38.2
Rio Grande do Norte 8.9 7.0 9.3 10.4 9.3 8.3 8.8 8.8 9.1 7.1 11.0 8.0
Rio Grande do Sul 28.4 25.5 28.2 22.8 27.3 16.8 30.5 20.0 32.0 14.8 30.5 17.3
Rondônia 3.9 3.6 6.7 9.0 1.6 5.6 5.0 4.6 8.1 4.9
Roraima 2.6 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5
Santa Catarina 11.8 9.8 14.3 12.7 15.0 8.5 15.7 14.7 13.5 9.4 14.6 12.2
São Paulo 85.9 124.0 89.1 74.1 157.9 78.4 109.9 64.7 119.5 71.8
Sergipe 4.9 7.0 6.8 8.6 6.8 9.0 6.8 5.2 6.5 4.3 6.6 4.7
Tocantins 4.9 4.1 4.9 2.4 5.6 0.7 7.1 4.0 5.8 3.2 5.5 3.6
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.5.  Econometric  model
We now propose an econometric model in order to compute conditional correlations and expand upon the information
reviously presented. The model we present is:
hhomjt =  β0 +  β1hgdpjt +  β2ppoljt +
K∑
k=3
βkXkjt +  Cj +  Tt +  εjt,  (1)
here hhomjt is the Hoover Index for homicides between the municipalities of state j in year t; hgdpjt is the Hoover
ndex for GDP; ppoljt is the % of Policemen in Capitals/Metros; Xkjt are covariates; Ci and Tt are fixed effects; and εjt
nd βs are the error term and the parameters, respectively.
As we are unable to observe ppol  we adjust the model to incorporate the proxy. Therefore, ppol  = α0 + α1ppol* + u,
here ppol* is the proxy calculated using data from IBGE, the αs are parameters and u  is an error term with a zero
ean.
As Table 3 suggests, α1 is likely positive and statistically significant. Considering this, we substitute
pol = α0 + α1ppol* + u  in Eq. (1) and encounter:
hhomjt =  (β0 +  α0β2) +  β1hgdpjt +  β2α1ppol∗jt +
K∑
k=3
βkXkjt +  Cj +  Tt +  ε∗jt . (2)It is necessary to note that the plimˆβ1 =  β1 +  β2Cov(hgdp,ppol)/Var(hgdp), which means the parameter estimating
he relationship between the interiorization of violence and the interiorization of the economy is likely biased. Thus,
e must account for the direction of this bias. In this sense, it appears reasonable that Cov(hgdp,ppol) is not negative,
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otherwise it would imply that police presence in urban areas would decrease when economic activity is more heavily
concentrated in these areas. Therefore, we assume the bias to be positive.
Additionally, as α1 > 0, the estimated sign for the product of β2α1 is entirely determined by β2. Therefore, if we
have a correlation between the Hoover for homicides and the concentration of the police force, there would also be a
correlation between the Hoover for homicides and the proposed proxy  for police force concentration.
4.  Estimated  results  and  discussion
Table 4 presents the results of four specifications of our model. The first specification, presented in column (1), is
the most basic and does not consider any Xkjt. There exists a significant correlation with the GDP Hoover, but not with
the proxy for police concentration.Specification (2) includes a variable with a linear tendency (t  = 1 for 1995, 2 for 1996, etc.), in order to capture
the continuous increase of the homicide rate in the interior over time, as presented in Fig. 1. Additionally, it includes
a dummy for the years 2001 and beyond (tdfsnp) to capture the onset of the increased public security expenditures
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Table 4
Estimation results.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
hgdp 0.3672* 0.3672* 0.3768** 0.3755*
(0.188) (0.188) (0.180) (0.213)
ppol 0.0037 0.0037 0.0025 −0.0005
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
t 0.0017 0.0018 −0.0011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
tdfsnp 0.0011 0.0011 0.0014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
tdarma −0.0054*** -0.0054*** −0.0027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
homrate 0.0001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001)
txpol 0.0694
(2.805)
dens 0.0021*
(0.001)
lngdp −0.0789
(0.150)
poor 0.1078
(0.121)
phcrm 1.4322
(1.253)
Fixed effects for time and states omitted
Constant 0.2341*** 0.2324*** 0.2271*** −0.0010
(0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.401)
Observations 442 442 442 442
R-squared 0.322 0.342 0.344 0.385
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
a
o
d
d
i
e
i
d
s
l
o
r
T
t
t
l
m* p < 0.1.
ssociated with the FNSP, as presented in Fig. 5. This specification also includes a dummy for 2004 and beyond in
rder to capture the effect of the Estatuto de Desarmamento (tdarma, Disarmament Statute), particularly in regards to
eclining homicide rates post 2004, mentioned in Fig. 1. This specification finds only the time dummy for the Estatuto
e Desarmamento to be correlated with the interiorization of violence.
Specification (3) builds upon the previous by including the homicide rate of the states (homrate), trying to determine
f more violent states are prone to greater interiorization of violence. The results suggest no evidence that violent states
xperienced interioriaztion to a greater extent.
The final specification in column (4) is the most robust and includes: the number of police per 100 thousand
nhabitants (txpol), testing if states with larger police presences have a more equal distribution of violence; population
ensity (dens), testing if more densely populated states have greater interiorization; the log of GDP (gdp), testing if
tates with larger GDP have a more equal distribution of violence; the percent of families with per capita family income
ess than half minimum wage (poor), testing if states with most unequal income distribution have greater interiorization
f violence; and, the percent of the population in capital and metropolitan regions that is young and male (phcrm),
eturning to the fact that “Nearly two in five of all registered deaths for men aged 15–24 are the result of homicides.”
here is little evidence that any of these covariates are strongly correlated with the interiorization of violence.
Given the wide array of variables related to violence, we realize that we could include more covariates. However,
he main objective of this research is not to find all  possible explanations for the interiorization of violence. Rather,
his research’s objectives are more modest: to empirically test the hypothesis of Andrade and Diniz (2013) using the
ocational homicide Hoover index as a measure for violence distribution, and to test the idea transmitted through the
edia that violence has spread to the countryside due to higher police concentrations in urban areas. To that end, the
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results of our empirical analysis are consistent with Andrade and Diniz (2013)’s findings that the violence is spreading
to more rural areas with new-found economic dynamism. However, we find little evidence of a relationship between
high concentrations of police in capital/metropolitan cities and the spread of violence to the countryside. Counter to
what is reported in the media, it seems that other factors are at play to incentivize criminals to pursue targets in the
countryside.
5.  Conclusion
This research proposes the use of locational Hoover indices as a superior method to capture the phenomenon of
the interiorization of violence put forward by Waiselfisz (2011). The locational Hoover, which captures the relative
imbalance between any two entities into a single variable, has advantages of straightforward numerical interpretation,
ease of calculation, and unlike the Gini index, is invariant to ordering in multivariate data sets. These are some of the
desirable characteristics that make the Hoover Index well-suited to analyze the dispersion of violence over time.
Additionally, we developed a proxy to measure the geographic concentration of the police force within states, to
overcome database limitations. This proxy was crucial to adequately investigate the media’s implied assertion that a
heavier police presence in urban areas caused a dispersion of violence to the less protected countryside. Furthermore, the
procedures used to develop this proxy could be repeated by future researchers to determine not only the concentration
of the police force, but host of other occupations whose intra state distributions are unknown. Even with the limitations
of current databases, researchers now have a reliable way to create a proxy for key variables in order to continue
analyzing important social trends.
Furthermore, the press implied a causal relationship between increased violence in more rural places and a lack of
policing in these areas relative to big cities. To investigate this possibility, this research utilizes the proxy developed to
explore the link between the dispersion of violence to the countryside and a heavier concentration of the police forces
in urban areas. While it is undisputed that less populated areas with few security resources are left more vulnerable to
crime and violence, this research finds no evidence supporting a causal link between high police concentrations in big
cities and the dispersion of violent crime. Violence certainly is spreading to the countryside, but it seems that other
factors are at play that are incentivizing criminals to pursue targets in the countryside.
Increased economic prosperity seems to be one of these factors that seems to incentivize the migration of violence. As
proposed by Andrade and Diniz (2013), violence diffused from urban centers to areas of increased economic dynamism
in less populated areas. Their research used spatial analysis to show that areas of greater economic prosperity, specifically
smaller Brazilian cities, was central to attracting violence. Our research validated their assertion via empirical methods
to arrive at the same conclusion: violence is following the money.
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